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REPENTANCE, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND SACRALITY
Douglas Sturm*
Let me begin by expressing deep thanks to James Washington for
his provocative essay.1 He has adopted an original tack on the topic
of this panel, namely, "An Historical Perspective of Religion's
Views of the Law of Church and State." His focus on the meaning
of conscience and the manner in which freedom of conscience con-
stitutes a central political and religious question in the modern age
is refreshing. As intended, his remarks are suggestive and bristle
with multiple possibilities and problems. I am particularly drawn to
his constructive suggestion that within our contemporary cultural
milieu, conscience be reinterpreted for constitutional purposes as
"adherence to the sanctity of the body."' He further suggests that
as a consequence of that reinterpretation, the First Amendment be
construed as providing protection of the bodily integrity of all citi-
zens, indeed all persons, if not all kinds and conditions of life, as a
"primal natural right."' As he is surely aware, that consequence
may be construed, as a Karl Llewellyn would remind us, either nar-
rowly or broadly.' Given Washington's reference to the Native
American belief in the sacredness of the land and how that belief
bears on the practice and theory of ownership, 5 I suspect he would
want that reinterpretation construed most broadly.
I have organized my remarks on the topic of "An Historical Per-
spective of Religion's Views of Law of Church and State" around
three themes: repentance, constitutionalism, and sacrality. While
these remarks are not in direct and explicit response to Washing-
ton's statement, they do bear on his concerns. In substance, the
* Professor of Religion and Political Science, Bucknell University. This Essay is a revised ver-
sion of comments presented on December 6 and 7, 1991, at the Conference on the Bicentennial of
the Bill of Rights sponsored by the Center for Church/State Studies, DePaul University College
of Law.
1. James M. Washington, The Crisis in the Sanctity of Conscience in American Jurisprudence,
42 DEPAUL L. REV. 11 (1992).
2. Id. at 24.
3. Id.
4. See KARL LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE (1962); KARL LLEWELLYN, BRAMBLE BUSH (1960).
5. Washington, supra note 1, at 24 n.53.
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three themes overlap, but I distinguish them for ease of organization
and presentation.
REPENTANCE
At this conference, we are commemorating the day on which the
final ratification of the American Bill of Rights was announced, De-
cember 15, 1791. But, lest we romanticize that moment and its sig-
nificance, I remind you that the Bill of Rights was born of political
compromise. It was the result of a rough and tumble political strug-
gle to establish a new constitution and became, upon ratification, an
integral part of that constitution.
That constitution, and more inclusively, this nation, were founded
in conquest. To be blunt, the Constitution, with its preamble about
justice, the general welfare, and the blessing of liberty, was a pack
of lies. When we reflect on the origins of this nation, we must, if we
are honest, give full acknowledgement to this fact and we should, if
we are at all sensitive to its implications, be driven to repentance.
On a personal level, I confess that since my college days - when
the dark side of American history became evident to me - I have
never been a comfortable citizen of this country. Howeyer, in many
respects, I love it dearly - including many aspects and aspirations
of its constitutional statement. It is so easy to neglect the sheer vi-
ciousness of our corporate history. We forget, to our detriment, that
this nation was born in violence, both direct and indirect - through
the massacre of thousands upon thousands of Native Americans,
through the exploitation and erosion of the earth, through the en-
slavement of thousands upon thousands of Africans, and through
the deliberate suppression of one-half of the population of people
who settled on the land (i.e., women).
As we are told, during this time of presumed celebration, that the
Bill of Rights is a prototypical charter of liberty, we must remember
that the liberty promised therein was at best a half-truth, that many
of the people who lived on this land were deliberately, even forcibly,
excluded from the privileges and immunities declared in that docu-
ment. This remains true, sad to say, even today. If I understand
correctly, James Washington - given his references and allusions
- would agree with me. He proposes, through his tendentious, but
tantalizing, extension of the religion clauses, to embrace conscience
understood as "adherence to the sanctity of the body," the rectifica-
[Vol. 42:61
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tion of this wrong." In short, what he proposes would entail a devel-
opment from deep repentance to radical reformation. Let us, he sug-
gests, at long last take with eminent seriousness the religion clauses
as signifying respect for the sanctity of all life in its material and
corporate embodiment. He would, out of a religious sensibility, press
the judicial community to repudiate the hypocrisies of our national
and constitutional past and to take the First Amendment religion
clauses with utmost seriousness to their furthest implications.
CONSTITUTIONALISM
Charles Howard McIlwain, throughout his extensive studies of
Western political thought, suggests that the minimal meaning of
constitutionalism is "limited government. '" 7 The tradition of consti-
tutionalism emerged from the idea that governments, by virtue of
their proper purposes as well as their temptations, must be circum-
scribed. They must be bounded. We must therefore define with
some care the arenas of our life into which governments must not be
permitted to intrude even as we define what role governments prop-
erly fulfill in our common life. As an historian, McIlwain was
keenly aware that over the course of centuries, the precise character
of the limits to governmental action was a source of constant debate
and was susceptible to alteration and change.
Without neglecting the hypocrisy of the Bill of Rights' promises
at the time it was ratified and throughout subsequent centuries, we
may nonetheless conceive of it at its best (together with its historical
counterpart, the French Declaration of the Rights of Citizen and
Man [sic]) as a milestone in the history of constitutionalism. These
proclaimed rights constitute a set of liberties, immunities,' and privi-
leges that citizens possess and that may not be - except for com-
pelling reasons, ultimately grounded in those rights themselves -
modified or denied by governmental powers. They constitute a
boundary for governmental action.
It is significant - even if only, in a sense, an accident of history
- that the first of the rights stated in the Bill of Rights as ratified
has to do with religion. The placement is fitting, given the signifi-
cance of religion in our human history. Yet therein lies an extraordi-
narily difficult conceptual problem with both theoretical and practi-
6. Id. at 26.
7. CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN. CONSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN (1947).
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cal import: What is the meaning of religion? How are we to
construe what sorts of understandings and practices are embraced
by the notion of religion? That has long been a puzzle in religious
studies and has been a puzzle in judicial decisions as well.
As Washington has noted, for some time in the West and in this
nation, we assumed that belief in some sort of supreme being - a
God - resides at the heart of religion.8 In conscientious objector
cases, for instance, those seeking an exemption from the armed ser-
vices on grounds of conscience were required to respond to the ques-
tion: "Do you believe in a supreme being?" 9 A negative answer was
sufficient to deny the application.' However, the Supreme Court's
approach to such cases took a radical turn in the cases of Welsh v.
United States" and United States v. Seeger. 2 When confronted
with conscientious objectors to participation in the armed services
who, by their own declaration, were not theists, the Supreme Court,
drawing upon language from Paul Tillich, adopted a "functional
equivalency" test.'" Belief in God as such was not deemed essential
to religion, at least for purposes of this line of cases.
Moreover, in the academic study of religion, we encounter a wide
range of diverse definitions of religion, many of which are intention-
ally not limited to theism. Paul Tillich stresses the notion of ulti-
macy;' 4 John Hick, the notion of transcendence;' 5 Mircea Eliade,
the notion of sacrality; 16 and Franklin Gamwell, the notion of com-
prehensive purpose.' 7 All these notions are presented as efforts to
embrace a vast plurality of philosophies, visions, and practices that
we would want to call, in some vital sense, "religious" whether or
not they are, in a strict sense, theistic - such as Confucianism,
Buddhism, Islam, Judaism, or Christianity.
8. Washington, supra note 1, at 45-49.
9. See Douglas Sturm, Constitutionalism and Conscientiousness: The Dignity of Objection to
Military Service, I J. & RELIGION 265, 268-69 (1983).
10. Id.
11. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
12. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
13. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 339-40; Seeger, 380 U.S. at 180.
14. PAUL TILLICH, DYNAMICS OF FAITH (1958).
15. JOHN HICK, AN INTERPRETATION OF RELIGION: HUMAN RESPONSES TO THE TRANSCEN-
DENT (1989).
16. MIRCEA ELIADE, THE SACRED AND PROFANE: THE NATURE OF RELIGION (Willard R.
Trask trans., Harcourt 1957).
17. FRANKLIN I. GAMWELL, BEYOND PREFERENCE 69-89 (1984). See also FRANKLIN 1.
GAMWELL, THE DIVINE GOOD: MODERN MORAL THEORY AND THE NECESSITY OF GOD 168
(1990).
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However, defined more specifically, it seems to me that all these
efforts to construe the meaning of religion affirm something along
the following lines, namely, that there is a dimension of reality after
which the human spirit reaches as integral to its own enhancement
which transcends the ordinary and the everyday. In that dimension,
the spirit bloweth as it listeth. In a certain sense, even if we wanted
to use coercive means in that dimension, the attempt would be futile
precisely because the spirit bloweth as it listeth. The human spirit
will break through all artificially induced boundaries because of its
obsession with the search for ultimate meanings, for transcendent
realities, for comprehensive purposes. More importantly, govern-
ments, given their proper functions, have no business even trying to
define, to direct, to dictate what people think and feel, envision, and
enact in that dimension because, in the final analysis, governments
are meant to serve the human spirit, not vice versa.
What I have affirmed as the impetus and character of religious
dimension of human life corresponds, I believe, with James Wash-
ington's approach to a redefinition of conscience, even including the
modifications suggested by Cole Durham.18 Conscience, as I would
phrase it in this context, is the human yearning for and apprehen-
sion of that which is, to the self, the dimension of ultimacy, tran-
scendence, comprehensive purpose. It is the apprehension of that
which will not let one go, of that which leads one hither and yon, of
that with which one is obsessed, of that which constitutes one's most
fundamental identity, of that whose character permeates in some
measure all one does and all one is. Conscience is the point at
which, as a matter of both judgment and fulfillment, there is a con-
junction between one's individual reality and that deeper or, if you
will, higher reality whose presence is the Alpha and Omega, the
beginning and the end, of our being.
In the religious dimension so understood, coercion is, in a sense,
contradictory. In theistic terms, coercion in religious matters de-
prives God of God's sovereignty. In nontheistic terms, coercion in
religious matters deprives the human spirit of its liberation and ful-
fillment. Governments not only ought to withhold their coercive
powers from encroaching upon that dimension; they ought to mani-
fest a decent respect for that dimension. That is the genius of the
religion clauses from a religious perspective and is a way of getting
18. W. Cole Durham, Jr., Religious Liberty and the Call of Conscience, 42 DEPAUL L. REV.
71 (1992).
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at James Washington's primary constructive thesis.
Washington, if I understand the import of his statement, focuses
on freedom of conscience as the centerpoint of church-state issues in
this country. He proposes as a redefinition of conscience "adherence
to the sanctity of the body.'"'" I take his reference to "body" to as-
sert that the burden and import of conscience are not exhausted in
belief alone. Freedom of conscience extends beyond freedom of be-
lief. Contrary to Thomas Jefferson's beliefs,"0 conscience, by virtue
of its character, pertains as well to social practice and institutional-
ized forms of interaction. Therefore, a respect for bodily integrity -
and hence for associational autonomy and cultural diversity - is
part and parcel, though not the sum total, of a respect for freedom
of conscience. That, I assume, is part of the implication of Washing-
ton's haunting query, posed at the conclusion of his statement,
"Who constrains nation-states that turn national interests into a fe-
tish even to the point of destroying human life and cultural diver-
sity?"21 As the institution of slavery demonstrates so starkly, to de-
grade the body is to degrade the spirit, to constrain free interaction
is to shackle the conscience, to stifle diversity in forms of life is to
smother the principle of life itself.
SACRALITY
As a bridge to this theme, let me assert that in my understanding,
constitutionalism properly construed does not put a premium on or-
derliness. Rather it institutionalizes tension. Constitutionalism, by
virtue of its respect for liberty, especially liberty in that deeper,
more ultimate dimension of reality about which I have spoken, en-
tails an acknowledgement that life in the human community is never
peaceful and quiet. It cannot be and should not be expected to be so.
It is always in conflict and turmoil.
Constitutionalism means that in our common life, we must so or-
19. Washington, supra note 1, at 24.
20. See ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 112 (1990) (quoting
Thomas Jefferson, Reply to the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802), in 8 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 113-14 (H. Washington ed., 1853)). Significantly, Chief Justice Morrison
Waite, in the first of the Mormon cases, construed Jefferson's doctrine of separation of church and
state, as stated in his response to the Danbury Baptists, as supporting a radical distinction be-
tween belief and action in interpreting the Free Exercise Clause: "Congress was deprived of all
legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of
social duties or subversive of good or'der." Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
21. Washington, supra note 1, at 60.
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ganize ourselves to sustain that conflict and turmoil - but to do so
in such a way that we stretch ourselves, not narrow ourselves; that
we broaden the possibilities for life, not constrict them; that we cele-
brate plurality, not drive toward conformity and uniformity. At the
same time, constitutionalism, in a seeming paradox, means that
there are boundary lines of a sort. They, however, are only boundary
lines resisting parochialism and provincialism. That is, we must re-
sist movements that tend to constrict and constrain the human spirit
(e.g., the destructive tactics of the Ku Klux Klan), not movements
whose purposes are to open up new possibilities of thought and ac-
tion (e.g., the ritual practices of the Native American Church).
As Cole Durham hinted in his preceding comments, 2 we confront
the question of who properly draws the line. In a recent issue of The
Journal of Law and Religion, a set of articles derived from a
Georgetown symposium on church and state addressed that ques-
tion." Stephen Pepper and William Marshall, in their articles, took
a traditional route of asserting that the state, with its concern for
public order, has the authority and duty to draw the line. 4 But
given the meaning of sacrality, I would take the side of John How-
ard Yoder who, in his response, rejected that assertion." According
to Yoder's interpretation, Pepper and Marshall were proposing that
government, given its purposes, has the authority to define a special
space for religion and should confine religion to that space." Yoder,
in reaction, reversed the equation. Affirming the supremacy of
sacrality, Yoder stated, in effect, that sacrality has the authority to
define a special space for government, not the other way around!
From a religious perspective, government is subordinate to the
higher reaches of the human spirit and must accommodate those
higher reaches. Religious liberty and its corollary, religious toler-
ance, are not a privilege granted by political authority; they consti-
tute a right grounded in the religious dimension. Sacrality is
supreme.
22. Durham, supra note 18.
23. See Georgetown Symposium on Church and State and Society and Law Colloquium, 7 J.L.
& RELIGION 257 (1989).
24. Stephen Pepper, A Brief for the Free Exercise Clause, 7 J.L. & RELIGION 323, 354-55
(1989); William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise
Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 357 (1989-90), reprinted in 7 J.L. & RELIGION 363, 401-03
(1989).
25. John H. Yoder, Response of an Amateur Historian and a Religious Citizen, 7 J.L. &
RELIGION 415, 415-16 (1989).
26. Id. at 418.
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This proposition, as Cole Durham reminds us, was affirmed dur-
ing the beginnings of this nation, not only by radical Protestants,
but also by enlightenment rationalistsY7 On this point, I would un-
derline a long standing conviction of mine, a conviction well-founded
in historical evidence, even though yet contested by historians and
theologians. According to a dominant tradition of interpretation,
Protestants and rationalists have been presented as, respectively, re-
ligionists (to whom sacrality is supreme) and secularists (for whom
public order takes priority over religious concerns). That interpreta-
tion, however, is contradicted by the historical record. As one telling
example, I would cite James Madison's Memorial and Remon-
strance28 in which he asserts:
This duty [which we owe our Creator] is precedent both in order of time
and in degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society. Before any man
[sic] can be considered as a member of Civil Society, he must be considered
as a subject of the Governor of the Universe: And if a member of Civil
Society, who enters into any subordinate Association, must always do it with
a reservation of his duty to the general authority; much more must every
man who becomes a member of any particular Civil Society, do it with a
saving of his allegiance to the Universal Sovereign.29
That is James Madison. This is not to say that all enlightenment
rationalists would support such a sentiment, but James Madison did.
Benjamin Franklin did, as well as others (e.g., Patrick Henry and
Thomas Paine). My point is that not only radical Protestants, but
also enlightenment Deists, understood the supremacy of sacrality.
From the standpoint of that premise, government's authority is sec-
ondary and subordinate.
I would conclude with a quotation from George Fox, the founder
of the Quakers. I am, I admit, fond of the Quaker tradition in many
ways. Regarding religious liberty, George Fox once wrote:
And let him [or her] be Jew or Papist or Turk or heathen or Protestant or
what sort so ever or such as worship sun or moon or stocks or stone, let them
have liberty where everyone may bring forth his [or her) strength and his
[or her] mind and judgment.80
That is a striking statement for its time. William Penn, who com-
27. Durham, supra note 18, at 79-85.
28. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, reprinted in
THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 5 (Mar-
vin Meyers ed., rev. ed. 1981).
29. Id. at 7.
30. MELVIN B. ENDY, JR., WILLIAM PENN AND EARLY OUAKERISM 315 (1973).
(Vol. 42:61
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posed constitutions for Eastern New Jersey and, later, for Pennsyl-
vania, came fairly close to Fox's expansive sentiment in his provi-
sion for religious liberty, albeit, in my judgment, not close enough.
Fox's sentiment, I would argue, is grounded in an understanding of
what it means to be human. To be human in the Quaker tradition is
to be possessed of an inner light. As Washington would remind us,
that is an understanding of conscience. The inner light corresponds
to the divine light. In that correspondence, we have entered upon
the realm of the sacred. At that point, if we would respect the inner-
most depths of our humanity, we must let people do their own
searching - whether they worship stones or sun, whether they be
Turk or Papist or heathen or Protestant. That is their reason for the
religion clauses in the Bill of Rights. From this standpoint, the reli-
gion clauses are protective of that sacred space beyond the jurisdic-
tion of government within which and through which we may con-
tinue our search for ultimate meaning.

